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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
V 
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
SUPREME COURT #920104 
#920087-CA 
#901502200 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal for an Interlocutory Order of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
In and for the County of Washington, State of Utah 
Honorable J. Philip Eves, Presiding 
The Defendant/Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr., by and through counsel, 
Alan D. Boyack, submits the following brief in support of it's petition for review of the Order 
of the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, 
State of Utah. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Appellant in this case is in jeopardy of capital punishment, and therefore, jurisdiction 
is exclusive,to the Supreme Court of Utah. In addition thereto, the Utah Court of Appeals has 
certified this case to the Utah Supreme Court. (See Appendix 1) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Was the order of the Honorable J. Philip Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
incorrect in allowing the legal standard of the defense of involuntary intoxication 
to be incorporated into the defense of insanity in accordance with §76-2-305(1) 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended? 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORIAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
§76-305-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended. 
Mental illness - Use as a defense - Influence of alcohol or other substance 
voluntarily consumed - Definition. 
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute or ordinance that the defendant, 
as a result of mental illness, lacked the mental state required as an element of the 
offense charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense. 
Colorado Statute CRS 18-1-804. 
...a person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if by reason of intoxication 
that is not self-induced at the time he acts, he lacks the capacity to perform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
In the early morning hours of July 22, 1990, the Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr., 
fired a fatal shot killing one Janice Fondren in her apartment located in St. George, Utah. At the 
time of the shooting, Appellant was unauthorized to be in the Fondren apartment. 
As the prosecution and the defense prepared their respective cases, it became apparent that 
a central issue of the defense would be Involuntary Intoxication. By prescription, Appellant had 
been using a medication known generically as Fluoxetine, manufactured by Eli Lily and marketed 
to the medical profession under the trade name Prozac. 
By way of mutual stipulation, both the defense and the prosecution requested that the 
Fifth Judicial District Court order the Appellant examined to see what effect, if any, psychotropic 
drugs in general and Prozac specifically had on the Appellant. 
During the period of examination which had been extended by the Utah State Hospital, 
Appellant was found by the Court to be incompetent to stand trial. The Appellant was in 
incompetency status for approximately one year, when both the prosecution and the defense 
requested that the director of the Utah State Hospital Forensic Unit evaluate the Appellant's 
competency status. After the second evaluation, Appellant was found competent to stand trial. 
Both the prosecution and the defense submitted to the Fifth Judicial District Court briefs 
as to the legal standard of Involuntary Intoxication in the State of Utah. On January 8, 1992, the 
District Court ruled, essentially, that the standard for Involuntary Intoxication would be, for all 
practical purposes, the same as the standard for the insanity defense. (See Appendix 2) 
Plea negotiations then took place, and it was agreed that the Appellant would enter a 
conditional plea to the crime of murder, conditioned upon his right to appeal to the Utah Supreme 
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Court the District Court's finding on the legal standard of Involuntary Intoxication. In exchange 
for the Appellant's plea of guilty, the State would not request the imposition of the death penalty. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Should the lack of a culpable mens rea, where the criminal acts of the actor are the direct 
and proximate result of a chemical substance administered through a physician, be excused? 
The State and the District Court have answered in the negative, unless the acts of the 
actor rise to the level of the standard articulated in §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
Amended. 
Appellant takes no exception whatsoever to the proposition that the standard of insanity 
defense is precisely as articulated in §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended. 
Respondent concedes that §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended does not 
expressly deal with the concept of Involuntary Intoxication. The Respondent argues that 
impliedly §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended is all-inclusive with any 
defense that deals with the state of mind of the actor. Respondent took the position that 
Involuntary Intoxication must be viewed in light of the codification of a mental illness defense 
as amended by the legislature in 1983. Appellant's precise point is that §76-2-305(1) Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 as Amended was designed to deal with a mentally ill actor, not an actor who, 
by virtue of intoxication of a chemical substance, commits a crime. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION IS AN INDEPENDENT DEFENSE SEPARATE 
AND APART FROM THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY. 
The issue narrowly framed is not what is the state of mind of the actor, but how he or she 
came by that state of mind. In the absence of statute, this honorable court should look to a well 
established common law. 
In order to gain insight into the legislative intent of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 
1953 as Amended, it is helpful to examine the contents of a report written by a distinguished task 
force committee. The Task Force Committee On Insanity Defense, writing for the 1983 
legislature, was a committee composed of elements of the defense and prosecution bar together 
with psychiatric professionals. 
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Committee Recommendations paragraph 5 of that report, a divided committee said in 
pertinent part: 
The committee recommended that the standard for determining 
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although 
mentally ill, would be whether fas a result of the mental illness (the 
Defendant) lacked a mental state required as an element of the 
offense charged'. Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a 
defense and the term mental illness would not include voluntary 
intoxication. Mental Illness would include a mental disease or 
defect (Emphasis Added By Committee) (See Appendix 3) 
Since the Task Force Committee chose to include voluntary intoxication for exclusion 
from the defense of insanity, then it follows that Involuntary Intoxication was not meant to be 
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brought within the focus of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended. 
The legislative intent was to include precisely what the committee stated; a mental disease 
or a defect only. Appellant states that but for the adverse effect of Prozac, the crime of murder 
could, or would not, have been committed. 
This Court has long recognized the fact that psychotropic drugs, as well as other chemical 
substances, may well cause radical human behavior. 
The Honorable Justice Durham, in writing for the majority in a case of very similar facts 
but different purpose of review said: 
"Because prescription drugs are chemical compounds designed to 
inter-react with the chemical and psychological processes of the 
human body, they almost always will pose some risk of side effects 
in certain individuals". 813 P2d 89 Utah (1991) - Grundberg v 
Upjohn 
The law has and will in the future fail to keep pace with pharmacological technology. 
Since the advent of Prozac on the market place in 1987, a firestorm of cases have arisen 
asserting that Prozac, in a small percentage of cases, leads otherwise unpredisposed persons to 
commit violent acts, to include homicide. 
The clear pre-legislative intent was to exclude temporary conditions caused by chemical 
substances that alter human behavior. In any case, by statute, the defense of Involuntary 
Intoxication does not have specific mention within §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as 
Amended, however voluntary intoxication is specifically mentioned by the study committee. The 
intention of the 1983 legislature could not envision a 1987 drug that would cause side effects and 
induce non-violent persons to commit violent acts as has come before us presently. Therefore, 
the logic of trying to fit the square peg concept of Involuntary Intoxication into the round hole 
9 
of §76-2-305(1) Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Amended will violate the long-established 
principal that an actor is not responsible for his acts if, through no fault of his own, some 
intervening extrinsic force causes those actions. The District Court in its ruling failed to discern 
that a person who acts from the input of a psychotropic drug by definition, would not be insane 
but rather intoxicated. 
Appellant well understands that the evidence of his intoxication may well have reduced 
his level of mens rea to the level of a lesser included offense, even if he was to have subjected 
himself to the jury under the standards provided by the insanity defense statute. 
The well established view of excusing a crime when the actor is without fault as to 
intoxication is followed in the sister state of Colorado. Colorado courts, as well as the Colorado 
Legislature, have addressed the subject of involuntary intoxication both by court decision and 
statute. Colorado Statute CRS 18-1-804 says in part... 
"...a person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if by 
reason of intoxication that is not self-induced at the time he acts, 
he lacks the capacity to perform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law." 
Respondents have heretofore asserted that the so-called "President Reagan/Hinckley Jury 
Decision" caused the Utah Legislature to make a major modification in its thinking on the 
insanity defense. They correctly assert that irresistible impulse, as followed in Colorado, has 
been specifically taken away by the 1983 legislature. To those assertions, the Appellant totally 
agrees. Appellant simply states that Involuntary Intoxication is not insanity and therefore the 
Legislature did not intend to take away that defense when it made its modification addressing the 
so-called Hinckley decision. Since Utah, unlike Colorado and other similarly situated states, is 
silent as to whether or not a defense of Involuntary Intoxication is an excuse, then this court 
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would not be in conflict with any legislative pronouncement if it were to follow a more 
fundamentally just rule of excuse in cases of Involuntary Intoxication. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Joseph Charles Gardner, Jr., took Prozac, by prescription rendered by two 
physicians. The trier fact would hear evidence that those physicians were never told, nor did 
they know, of any possible side effects. 
The evidence would clearly show that Appellant was susceptible to the side-effects of the 
drug. 
Therefore, this Appellant respectfully requests of this court that he be allowed to be heard 
before the trier of fact to test the facts of Involuntary Intoxication. 
If Appellant was then able to show that he was Involuntarily Intoxicated within the 
meanings as heretofore set forth, the trier fact could find that at the time, the Appellant was 
intoxicated with Fluoxetine, through no fault of his own, then he would not be criminally 
responsible as a matter of law, thereby reversing the standard as previously set forth in the Fifth 
Judicial District. 
DATED this 28th day of July, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ALAN D: BOYACK 
BOYACK & BOYACK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
205 East Tabernacle Street 
St. George, UT 84770 
(801) 628-2676 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed ten (10) true and correct copies, one 
with an original signature, of the foregoing brief of Appellant to: 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
Mr. Geoffrey J. Butler 
332 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed eight (8) true and correct copies, 
one with an original signature, of the foregoing brief of Appellant to: 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
I hereby certify that I caused to be air-mailed four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing brief of Appellant to: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM - 3312 
Attorney General 
CREIGHTON C. HORTON II - 1542 
Assistant Attorney General 
KEVIN L. McCLOSKEY - 2152 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed one (1) true and correct copy of the 
foregoing brief of Appellant to: 
ERIC A. LUDLOW - 5104 
Washington County Attorney 
W. BRENT LANGSTON - 4614 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North 200 East 
St. George, UT 84770 
DATED this 30th day of July, 1992. 
Julie W. Barton-Secretary to Alan D. Boyack 
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APPENDIX 
1. Court Order from the Utah Court of Appeals stating transfer of case to Utah Supreme 
Court. (Referred from page 5) 
2. Order regarding the Standard Applicable to Defense of Involuntary Intoxication. (Referred 
from Page 6) 
3. Task Force Committee on Insanity Defense. (Referred from page 8) 
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IN THE UTAH ^ OURT^T^PPE^E? 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Joseph Charles Gardner, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
T FEB 2 11992 
fc'ar/ r 'teonan 
Giei> :. 'he Court 
jlahCc^rt of Appeals 
ORDER 
Case No. 920087-CA 
Upon the Court's own notion, the abcv^ e appeal appears to be 
within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Now therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above appeal is 
transferred to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 44, Utah 
R. App. P. 
Dated this J\ ™ day of February 1992 
FOR THE CQURT: 
Mary Tf. froohan l r  
Clerk-bf the Court 
*f 
jn i r 
Eric A. Ludlow #5104 'S? Jpy 
Washington County Attorney o fi/7 Q ]o 
178 North 200 East CLtas 
St. George, Utah 84770 /! , DEPlirV 
(801) 634-5723 ' - ^ J/V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH CHARLES GARDNER, JR., 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: LEGAL STANDARD 
APPLICABLE TO DEFENSE OF 
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION 
Criminal No. 901502200 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on 
the 26th day of November, 1991, on State's motion for pretrial 
determination of the legal standard applicable to the defense of 
involuntary intoxication, and the Defendant being present and 
represented by Alan D. Boyack, the Plaintiff being represented by 
Eric A. Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, and both Counsel having 
indicated the desire for a pretrial determination of the applicable 
legal standard, and the Court allowed supplemental briefing at the 
Defendant's request. The Court having now reviewed the memoranda 
and supplemental memoranda of the parties, hereby issues the 
following order pertaining to the legal standards and principles 
applicable to the case as follows: 
1. Involuntary intoxication leading to temporary mental 
illness can constitute a defense, if brought within the provisions 
of Section 76-2-305(1), the Utah Code Annotated, which governs all 
mental illness defenses by its very terms. ["It is a defense to a 
prosecution... that the defendant, as a result of mental illness, 
lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense 
nrrmNi-n.^  z. <,rage z or z; 
charged. Mental illness is not otherwise a defense.11] 
2. Irresistible impulse, or a determination of whether a 
defendant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law, is no longer the legal standard applicable to 
a mental illness defense in Utah, since the Utah Legislature in 
enacting the present law (L. 1983, ch. 49, Section 1) specifically 
repealed the former test for insanity, which then included lacking 
substantial capacity "to conform [one's] conduct to the 
requirements of law." (L. 1973, ch. 196, Section 76-2-305). 
3. By statute, involuntary intoxication cannot 
constitute a complete defense to any crime which contains as an 
element of the charge or of a lesser included offense the culpable 
mental state of recklessness or of criminal negligence. [Utah Code 
Ann. Section 76-2-306 provides that "...if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an offense and the actor is 
unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his 
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense."] 
4. Mental illness induced by voluntary intoxication is 
not a defense in Utah. ["A person who is under the influence of 
voluntary consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances, or 
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense is not 
excused from criminal responsibility on the basis of mental 
illness." Utah Code Ann. Section 76-2-305(3).] 
DATED this Q - day of January, 1992. 
3fl PHILIP EV 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
^ 
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TASK FORCE COMMITTEE ON INSANITY DEFENSE 
A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chairman 
Ronald N. Boyce, Esq. 
Dr. Lincoln Clark 
Earl R. Dorius, Esq. 
J. Thomas Greene, Esq. 
Dr. Bernard Grosser 
W. Eugene Hansen, Esq. 
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A REPORT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 
AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
The problem of insanity and the criminal defendant has been 
a matter of concern almost since the inception of criminal prose-
cutions. Early in the development of the English criminal law 
it was ruled that a criminal act could not be punished if the 
actor had no more mental capacity than a "wild beast" or did not 
know "good from evil." As the judicial and medical communities 
acquired more sophistication concerning the mentally disturbed 
offender, the courts grappled with the issue of whether the 
ancient tests ought to be retained• In 1843, thirteen judges of 
the Queens Bench in England promulgated the so-called M'Naghten 
test in assessing whether the court that had acquitted Daniel 
M'Naghten in the killing of the Secretary to the Prime Minister of 
England had acted erroneously. 
1. The M'Naghten Rule. 
The test for insanity as articulated by the English judges 
was that if a defendant, because of a defect in reason due to 
a disease of the mind, did not know the quality of his act or 
know that it was wrong, he was entitled to be acquitted* The 
standard was adopted at a time when the English courts had not 
fully developed the concept of Criminal intent" or the state of 
mind necessary to convict of certain offenses. The test of 
insanity was independent of the mental state required for the 
offense and made the concept of insanity an affirmative defense. 
The M'Naghten test was scon adopted in the United States and 
became the standard defense of insanity in almost all jurisdic-
tions in this country* 
2* Irresistible Impulse Test. 
After M'Naghten had been utilized for a number of years, 
some courts supplemented the M'Naghten standard by the so-called 
"irresistible impulse" test. That standard provided that if a 
criminal actor could not conform his conduct to the right he was 
entitled to acquittal. Utah adopted the modification of the 
MfNaghten rule and it remained the law in the State of Utah up 
until 1973, when the Utah Criminal Code was modified to adopt a 
new standard* 
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Other courts continued to struggle with the M'Naghten for-
irrula and its modifications, and in 1954 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the so-
called Durham test for insanity, which would exonerate a defen-
dant if his criminal conduct was the product of a mental disease 
or defect. Most states rejected this experimentation as being 
too vague and too open-ended, and several years later the court 
that first articulated the test rejected it. 
3. ALI and Utah Rule* 
In the meantime, the American Lew Institute promulgated a 
new test for the insanity defense which was a modified version 
of the M•Heighten rule plus irresistible impulse test that had 
been in effect in some states including Utah. The new version 
further expanded the insanity defense by providing that a person 
was not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of such 
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the actor lacked 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
This standard was adopted by statute in the State of Utah in 1973. 
(S 76-2-305, Utah Code Ann, 1953). Further, in the State of Utah, 
the burden of proof is on the prosecution, when any evidence of 
insanity is raised, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at 
the time the defendant committed the criminal act he was legally 
sane. In other states that burden is cast on the defendant* 
4. Utah Law Compared to that in Hinckley, 
ttte law in the State of Utah is today identical to the law 
existing in the District of Columbia as it was applied in the 
criminal prosecution against John Hinckley for the attempted 
assassination of President Reagan. Although the Hinckley case has 
awakened public concern with the insanity defense, many lawyers, 
psychiatrists and scholars have been disenchanted with both the 
H'Naghten standard and the American Lav Institute standard for some 
time. An extensive review of the legal and psychiatric literature 
discussing the insanity defense has been made by the committee. 
Although only a small percentage of criminal cases involve instances 
where the defense of insanity is claimed, that fact is no justifi-
cation for perpetuating an erroneous legal standard if, in fact, 
an erroneous legal standard has been adopted. 
After extensive study, the coitcnittee concluded that the 
current test for insanity in the State of Utah was conceptually 
erroneous. The error was not so much in the action taken by the 
Axr>erican Law Institute as it was in the original concept of the 
insanity defense as outlined by the thirteen English judges in 
the M'Naghten case. The committee has concluded that the ques-
tion that the jury or judge ought to address is whether the crimi-
nal dtfondunt at the time of the commission of the act had the 
required state of mind defined for the commission of the offense. 
2-
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If e mental disease or defect precluded the defendant from enter-
taining the state of mind required for the offense charged, the 
defendant vould be entitled to an acquittal on the charged offense 
and either a conviction should be entered on a lesser included 
offense for which the defendant did have the requisite state of 
mind, or if no such state of mind existed, the defendant should 
be acquitted altogether. 
The defendant who is mentally ill, but not without the power 
to form the required criminal intent, ought to be convicted the 
same as any other defendant who cosnitted a crime with the 
requisite state of mind* Such a conceptualization makes the 
claim of mental illness relevant to the state of mind of the 
defendant at the time of the commission of the offense, just as 
if the defendant had raised defenses other than mental illness, 
such as mistake of fact or lack of intent or any other condition 
that would cause a judge or jury to find that the defendant did 
not commit the offense charged, The insanity defense would no 
longer be an affirmative defense to be considered by the trier 
of fact independent of the defendant's state of mind. The burden, 
of course, would be on the prosecution, as it now is, to show 
that the defendant acted with the required criminal intent but 
there would be no other burden required to be met by the prosecution, 
nor would there" be any other legal concept for the jury to_considerT 
This standard has been proposed by eminent scholars throughout 
the United States and is reflected in proposed legislation cur-
rently before Congress, and legislation that has been before 
Congress in one form or another since 1573. This conceptual for-
mat has recently been adopted in one fora or another with the 
same effect in the Statr .%t>f Idaho, Montana and Alabama. 
5. Committee Recommendation* 
The committee recommended that the standard for determining 
whether a defendant should be convicted of an offense, although 
mentally ill, would be whether 
*as a result of the mental illness [the 
defendant] lacked the mental state required 
as an element of the offense charged." 
Mental illness would not otherwise constitute a defense and 
the term mental illness would not include voluntary intoxication. 
Mental illness would include a mental disease or defect* The 
legislation proposed by the committee would authorize a specific 
plea of "not guilty due to mental illness" and invoke procedures 
for examination of a defendant by qualified experts to determine 
the condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of 
the offense. The so-called battle of the psychiatrists would 
not be entirely eliminated, but it would be significantly reduced 
-3-
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because the scope of psychiatric opinion would consider only the 
question of whether tha defendant had the required criminal state 
of mind, and would not consider what the committee believes to be 
the unanswerable question as to volition* 
If, however, there ever were a defendant with such a deranged 
condition that he absolutely could not control his behavior 
(although he knew what he was doing) , his actions would not be 
*voluntary acts* within the requirement of the Utah Penal Code 
(S 76-1-601(1), Utah Code Km. 1953). It is unlikely, in any 
event, that any such person would ever be brought to trial. The 
effect of the new test for insanity would be to narrow the defense 
from its current broad standard to one examining the mental state 
of the defendant at the time that the act was committed, ajid to 
harmonize it with the prosecution's burden in every criminal case. 
The total abolition of any consideration of mental illness or 
insanity would, in the committee's opinion, be unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, the defendant who raises a defense of mental illness 
on the issue of the requisite state of mind cannot be deprived of 
the opportunity to offer relevant evidence on the issue. To do so 
would treat the mentally ill defendant in a different classifica-
tion from other defendants who might also raise the defense of the 
lack of required state of mind and the disparate treatment would 
deny such defendant the equal protection of the law* 
The committee also recommends that changes be made in the 
Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure to harmonize the new 
mental illness concept with required court procedures, including 
the requirement that notice be given not only of a claim of total 
exoneration due to mental illness, but of any claim of diminished 
capacity. The defendant could enter a plea that he lacked the 
required mental capacity, or in the alternative, could deny the 
commission of the offense itself. (This could occur in a homicide 
case where a defendant contends that he was so mentally ill as to 
be unable to form the required state of mind for the commission 
of the offense, but that if he had the required state of mind to 
commit the offense, he was privileged to act as he did due to 
self-defense.) 
6. 'Guilty and Mentally 111" Concept. 
The committee believes that the proposed legislation would 
significantly improve the administration of justice in instances 
where xnental illness is an issue in a criminal prosecution. In 
order to deal with the instances where a defendant may be mentally 
ill, but not so ill as to be free from criminal responsibility/ 
the committee proposes that the concept of "guilty and mentally 
ill" be added to Utah law to deal with a special class of offenders* 
APPENDIX 3 (Page 6 of 8) 
This concept has currently been adopted in some form by the 
legislatures of at least ten states. The committee did not parrot 
the legislative format in any state, but tailored the proposal to 
what was 'believed to be the best consensus of all the legislation 
and one compatible with and in keeping with the available resources 
in the State of Utah. 
Accordingly, under the Committee proposal, S 77-13-1, Utah 
Code Ann, (1953) would be amended to include five possible pleas 
to the offense charge^L In addition to the pleas cf'not guilty*, 
'guilty and*no contest currently provided for under the statute, a 
defendant could enter a plea of Mnot guilty by reason of mental 
illness,* or Hguilty and mentally ill." If a defendant enters a 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness, as previously 
explained, he would place in issue the question of whether his 
alleged mental illness precluded him from entertaining the state 
of mind required for the offense charged. (A defendant would be 
allowed to plead not guilty, or in the alternative, not guilty by 
reason of mental illness.) 
If, on the other hand, a defendant enters a plea of "guilty 
and mentally ill," such would not exonerate or excuse defendant's 
conduct. The offender found "guilty and mentally ill" is a person 
responsible for his criminal activities and held accountable for 
such under the law, but who may need specialized treatment* 
In view of the additional pleas authorized under the Committee 
proposal, the Committee also recommends amendment of S 77-35-21(a) 
to allow the jury, in addition to a verdict of guilty or not guilty, 
to return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of mental illness," 
"guilty and mentally ill," "not guilty of the crime charged but: 
guilty of a lesser included offense," or "not guilty of the crime 
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense and mentally ill." 
7. Procedure upon Entry of a Plea of "Guilty and Mentally 111." 
If a defendant proffers a plea of guilty and mentally ill, 
the Court will hold a hearing to determine the claims of mental 
illness, and may order an evaluation of defendant by a suitable 
medical facility. If the trial judge finds that the defendant was 
mentally ill within the definition of that term, the judge could 
then dispose of the offender through various alternatives that 
would insure some degree of special custody and/or treatment. If 
the judge found that the defendant was not mentally ill, the guilty 
plea remains.and .the defendant would be sentenced as any other 
offender. 
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If the defendant enters a plea of "not guilty by reason of 
mental illness,* a jury could also receive evidence that the 
defendant, wae currently mentally ill, aa well as at the time of 
the commission of the offense, and could return a verdict of 
"guilty and mentally ill*. However, the jury's verdict would be 
subject to a post-verdict hearing and the court would be required 
to confirm that the defendant was, in fact, currently mentally ill. 
If the defendant was found to be mentally ill, the court could then 
dispose of the case by sentencing the offender to the term pro-
vided by law, but the offender could be institutionalized or dealt 
with in a more suitable custodial or therapeutic setting. 
The criteria for defining a person "guilty and mentally ill," 
and thereby subject to the special disposition by the court, have 
been carefully and narrowly drawn so as not to overload the mental 
health system which already has limited resources. Only those 
offenders who meet a carefully selected mix of criteria would be 
eligible for this special disposition. This process allows for 
the identification, confirmation and disposition of those special 
offenders who should not be excused from criminal responsibility 
but who should be recognized as having special needs requiring_a 
particular type of custody or treatment. 
An offender found guilty and mentally ill would not be 
released from serving his sentence unless the Board of Pardons 
determined, under criteria normally applied by the Board, that 
the person should be released. Additionally, if the Board con-
siders a defendant for parole, it must consult with the treating 
facility, and upon recommendation of the facility, will make 
continued treatment a condition of parole. 'A person determined 
to be guilty and mentally ill who is in need of further institu-
tionalization beyond the period provided by the criminal offense 
for which he was convicted should be certified for commitment 
through civil process. 
Studies that have been done of the application of the "guilty 
and mentally ill11 concept in other jurisdictions have shown that 
it does not overburden the system, does not provide an excuse for 
juries to convict when they shouldn't, and is not used to excuse 
a defendant's conduct. The concept appears to have been especially 
promising in the State of Michigan. 
B. Conclusion. 
The concepts that the Committee has recommended for legislative 
adoption have been thoughtfully considered. They are based upon 
considerations of scholarly analysis, empirical research reports, 
multi-disciplinary input, and sources outside of the Committee, 
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itself, which have been carefully and intelligently advanced by 
persons interested in this subject matter. It is believed that 
the Committee report reflects the best thinking of the legal and 
mental health community in the state and is corroborated by 
similar conclusions from others in Utah and in other parts of the 
country. Therefore/ the Committee respectfully recommends to the 
Legislature the adoption of the attached legislation relating to 
the issue of insanity and mental illness in criminal cases as 
proposed by the Committee. 
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